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Abstract : This study aims to find out the considerations of the Constitutional Court Judge in issuing 
Constitutional Court Decision No. 36/PUU-XV/2017 as well as to identify the implications of the Decision on 
the Independence of Corruption Eradication Commission. The method used in this study was normative 
juridical method. The data collected through library research were then analyzed analytic-descriptive. The 
formulations of the problem are; 1) What are the considerations of the Constitutional Court Judge in issuing 
Constitutional Court Decision No. 36/PUU-XV/2017 against judicial review of Law No. 17 of 2017 concerning 
MD3? and 2) What are the implications of the Constitutional Court Decision No. 36/PUU-XV/2017 against 
judicial review of Law No. 17 of 2017 concerning MD3 on the independence of Corruption Eradication 
Commission? As results, it was found that; 1) in Constitutional Court Decision No. 36/PUU-XV/2017, the 
Constitutional Court states that the inquiry right owned by the House of Representatives over the Corruption 
Eradication Commission is constitutional as long as it does not relate to the authority of investigation and 
prosecution owned by the Corruption Eradication Commission with the consideration that the Corruption 
Eradication Commission is a state institution that includes to the realm of executives; and 2) The House of 
Representatives will give a strong influence on the Corruption Eradication Commission even though the inquiry 
right owned by the House of Representatives cannot touch the authority of the Corruption Eradication 
Commission in conducting investigations and prosecutions. However, there is an indication that the effort to 
provide inquiry right is not a legal effort but rather a political effort which is widely applied in countries 
adhering to a parliamentary system where the parliament tends to be more dominant than the executive. 
Hence, it can be concluded that; 1) in this Decision, the Constitutional Court Judge did not use a stronger 
grammatical and systematic interpretation based on the original intense. Besides, this Decision is ambiguous 
and potentially contradicts with the previous Decision, namely Constitutional Court Decision No.012-016-
019/PUU-IV/2006; and 2)  there will be consequences for the Corruption Eradication Commission in the future, 
especially in terms of independence, since it can be used as an object of inquiry right by the House of 
Representatives. 
Keywords: Decision, Constitutional Court, Independence, Corruption Eradication Commission. 
 
Implikasi Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi No. 36/PUU-XV/2017 Terhadap 
Independensi Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi 
 
Abstrak : Tujuan dari pennelitian ini adalah untuk mengetahui pertimbangan Hakim Konstitusi dalam 
memutus perkara No. 36/PUU-XV/2017 dan Implikasi dari putusan tersebut terhadap Independensi Komisi 
Pemberantasan Korupsi. Metode penelitian yang digunakan yaitu  hukum normatif dengan cara 
studikepustakaan,data yang digunakan  adalah data sekunder dananalisis data dilakukan secara deskriptis 
analitis. Rumusan masalahnya  adalah (1). Bagaimanakah pertimbangan Hakim  Konstitusi dalam memutus 
perkara No. 36/PUU-XV/2017 terhadap pengujian UU No. 17 Tahun 2017 Tentang MD3 dan (2). 
Bagaimanakah implikasi putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi  No.36/PUU-XV/2017 terhadap pengujian UU No. 17 
Tahun 2017 Tentang MD3 terhadap independensi Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi. Berdasarkan penelitian 
diperoleh hasil (1) MK dalam putusan No. 36/PUU-XV/2017 menyatakan  bahwa kewenangan hak angket yang 
dilakukan  Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat  terhadap Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi adalah konstitusional 
sepanjang tidak menyangkut kewenangan penyidikan, penyelidikan, dan penuntutan yang dimiliki oleh Komisi 
Pemberantasan Korupsi, dengan pertimbangan  Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi adalah lembaga negara yang 
termasuk ranah eksekutif. (2). Pengaruh tekanan yang diberikan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat  kepada Komisi 
Pemberantasan Korupsi akan amat kuat walaupun hak angket tersebut tidak dapat menyentuh kewenangan 
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Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi dalam melakukan penyidikan, penyelidikan, dan penuntutan. Namun ada 
indikasi bahwa upaya angket pada dasarnya bukanlah upaya hukum melainkan upaya yang bersifat politis 
yang banyak dipraktekkan dalam negara penganut sistem parlementer yang cenderung dominan parlemen 
dibanding pihak eksekutif.Kesimpulan dari penelitian ini adalah (1).  Dalam putusan ini Hakim Konstitusi tidak  
menggunakan penafsiran gramatikal dan sistematis yang lebih kuat dengan berlandaskan pada original intens. 
Selain ituPutusan Mahkamah Konstitusi ini adalah ambigu dan  berpotensi bertentangan dengan putusan 
sebelumnya yaitu putusan  Mahkamah Konstitusi  No.012-016-019/PUU-IV/2006.(2)  Adanya konsekuensi 
bagi Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi dimasa mendatang khususnya dalam hal independensi  akibatdari dapat 
dijadikannya objek hak angket oleh Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat 
Kata Kunci: Putusan, Mahkamah Konstitusi, Independensi,  Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi. 
 
  
INTRODUCTION 
An important aspect in the transition process of Indonesia to democracy is reforms in the 
state administration carried out through amendments to the Indonesian constitution, namely the 1945 
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. The amendments to the 1945 Constitution aim to realize 
the Indonesian constitution which enables the implementation of a modern and democratic state.
1
 The 
spirits of constitutional change are found in the form of the constitution supremacy, the necessity and 
importance of power restrictions, the strict regulations on relations and powers between branches of 
state power, the reinforcement of check and balance system between branches of power, the 
reinforcement of protection and guarantee of human rights, the implementation of regional autonomy 
and the regulations on basic matters in various fields of public life to create a democratic state based 
on the rule of law.
2
 In addition to democracy, Plato introduced the idea of the state based on the rule 
of law with the term ‘nomocracy’.3 Over time, the great state power gave birth to the concept of a 
rechstaat state which is considered as an ideal concept of the state at this time, even though the 
concept is implemented with different perceptions in the modern state system. Basically, this concept 
is implemented based on the teachings of Jhon Locke, Thomas Hobbes, J.J. Rosseau and Montesqieu. 
The countries concerned have begun to implement and develop a democratic state system by 
restricting state power through the system of power distribution with recognition and protection to 
people’s rights.4 
Basically, law cannot be separated from people lives as they need legal protection to avoid 
conflict. The protection provided by law is one of the goals of the state based on the rule of law. 
Meanwhile, the best way to achieve the goals is to distribute powers.
5
 The distribution of powers 
gives birth to various state organs that connect the classical thought of state administration law. As 
result, the structure of the state powers is divided into three branches, namely legislative, executive, 
and judiciary. These three branches of power subsequently become a limit for the formation of 
various state institutions. Simply put, all state institutions established to carry out state functions are 
an integral part of the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of power contained in the 1945 
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.
6
 
In addition to state institutions mentioned in the 1945 Constitution, the form of the state 
institutions is currently developing rapidly. These developments also took place in Indonesia amid 
the openness that emerge along with a wave of democratization in the reform era. At the first level, 
                                                             
1
 Yusri Munaf,2014, Konstitusi & Kelembagaan Negara, Pekanbaru : Marpoyan Tujuhh Publishing, p. 57. 
2
Ibid., 
3
Imam Subechi, Jurnal Hukum dan Peradilan volume 3, Sekretariat Mahkamah Agung RI, Jakarta, 2013, p. 
340. 
4
Munir Fuadi, 2010, Teori Negara Hukum Modern (rechstaat),  Bandung : Refika Aditama, p. 31. 
5Teguh Prasetyo, “Membangun Hukum Nasional Berdasarkan Pancasila”,Jurnal Hukum Dan Peradilan, 
Volume 03 No. 3, 2014, p.213. 
6
Zainal Arifin Mochtar, 2016,Lembaga Negara Independen : Dinamika Perkembangan dan Urgensi 
Penataannya Kembali Pasca Amandemen Konstitusi, Jakarta : Raja Grafindo Persada, p. 1. 
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there is a growing awareness that certain state agencies, such as Military Organization, Police Office, 
Prosecutors General Office, and Central Bank, must be developed independently. This independence 
is needed in order to guarantee the distribution and limitation of power and to create more effective 
democratization. Three of the four aforementioned state agencies that have an independent position 
are Indonesian National Armed Force, Indonesian National Police and Bank of Indonesia.
7
 
At the second level, there are also developments relating to specialized institutions, such as 
National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM), General Election Commission (KPU), 
Ombudsman Commission, Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), etc. Ideally, these 
commissions or institutions are independent or often have mixed functions, namely semi-legislative, 
semi-executive, semi-administrative, and semi-judicial. In fact, the term “independent and self-
regulatory bodies” has also emerged in many countries.8  Corruption Eradication Commission as one 
of the institutions born from constitutional reform was established based on Law. Corruption 
Eradication Commission was established based on Law No. 30 of 2002 concerning Commission for 
the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Corruption. Article 1 of Law No. 30 of 2002 states: “the 
eradication of criminal acts of corruptions is a series of actions with the purpose to prevent and 
eradicate criminal acts of corruption through coordinated efforts, supervision, monitoring, 
investigations, indictments, prosecutions, all to be done with as much participation on the part of the 
general public as the Law allows”.9 
The establishment of Corruption Eradication Commission and other commissions is a result 
of various economic difficulties and instability due to social and economic changes. Hence, the state 
carries out institutional experimentation through various forms of government organs that are 
considered effective and efficient, both at the national or central level and at the regional or local 
level. In developed countries, such as the United States of America and France, there are also various 
new state institutions, which were commonly referred to as state auxiliary institutions, established in 
the last three decades of the 20th century. Among these institutions, there are also self-regulatory 
agencies, independent supervisory bodies, or institutions that carry out mixed functions between 
regulative, administrative, and punishment functions which are usually separated, but are carried out 
simultaneously by these new institutions.
10
 Corruption Eradication Commission was established with 
the aim of suppressing the number of corruption that has not been able to be controlled by the 
National Police and the Prosecutors’ Office. In this case, Corruption Eradication Commission has the 
authority to conduct wiretapping against someone suspected to conduct criminal act of corruption. As 
stated in general explanation of Law No. 30 of 2002 concerning Commission for the Eradication of 
Criminal Acts of Corruption that corruption has been widespread in Indonesia.
11
 
In carrying out its duties and functions, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) 
experienced friction with the House of Representative (DPR) due to the fact that many DPR 
members were examined and arrested by KPK. The dispute between DPR and KPK culminated when 
DPR requested the recording of conversations in the investigation process of a DPR member, 
Miryam S. Haryani. However, the request was rejected by KPK as it was considered to interfere with 
                                                             
7Ni’matul Huda, 2005, Hukum Tata Negara, Jakarta : Rajawali Pers, p. 218. 
8
Ibid.,  
9
Indonesia, Undang-Undang No.30 Tahun 2002   Tentang  Komisi  Pemberantasan  Tindak Pidana Korupsi, 
Lembaran 
 Negara Republik  Indonesia  (LNRI)  Tahun 2002  Nomor 137 dan Tambahan Lembaran Negara  (TLN)  
Nomor 4250 
 
10
Jimly Asshiddiqie, 2012, Perkembangan & Konsolidasi Lembaga Negara Pasca Reformasi, Jakarta : Sinar 
Grafika, p. 7.    
11
Kristian & Yopi Gunawan, 2013, Sekelumit Tentang Penyadapan Dalam Hukum Positif di Indonesia, 
Bandung :Nuansa Aulia, p. 69. 
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the law enforcement process.
12
 Hence, DPR as a legislative body seems to respond this issue by using 
its inquiry right as KPK is considered to have a strong authority so that there should be an institution 
that can supervise policies issued by KPK. This issue encourages the Forum of Law and 
Constitutional Studies (FKHK) to submit a material test to Constitutional Court (MK) against Article 
79 paragraph (3) of Law No. 17 of 2014 concerning MPR, DPR, DPD and DPRD. Yet, through 
Constitutional Court Decision No. 36/PUU-XV/2017, the Constitutional Court rejected the request 
by interpreting that KPK includes to the realm of executives so that KPK can be an object of inquiry 
right by DPR. 
Constitutional Court Decision No. 36/PUU-XV/2017 concerning the constitutionality test of 
the House of Representatives’ inquiry right against Corruption Eradication Commission has cut the 
existing opinion that KPK is an independent state institution, not an executive state institution, so that 
KPK is not an object of inquiry right of DPR. For some parties, the decision is considered to be 
controversial as it has made KPK a part of executive organ.
13
 Making KPK as an object of inquiry 
right by DPR will affect its performance and independence in law enforcement process in the future 
and will give birth to new tyrannical instruments for DPR.
14
 On the other hand, there are also a few 
people who agree with this decision as they consider that making KPK as an object of inquiry right 
by DPR does not necessarily weaken KPK. Besides, this issue can also be interpreted as the control 
made by DPR over KPK so that KPK can carry out its duties and functions in accordance with the 
existing legal provisions.
15
  Hence, basically, this Constitutional Court Decision gave rise to pros and 
cons in the community. 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
                        This study employed a normative legal research method. The secondary data used in this 
study involved Constitutional Court Decision No. 36/PUU-XV/2017 against Judicial Review of Law 
No. 17 of 2014 concerning MPR, DPR, DPD, and DPRD and Constitutional Court Decision No. 012-
016-019/PUU-XV/2017 against Judicial Review of Law No. 30 of 2002 concerning Commission for 
the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Corruption as well as other related journals, books and 
legislation. The data collected through library research were then analyzed analytic-descriptive. The 
analysis phase involved data collection, data selection, data classification which was done 
systematically, logically and juridically to find out the specific picture of the problem under study, 
and finally data interpretation. Further, the data were compared to the theories and concepts collected 
from the secondary data which consist of scientific books, journals, legislation as well as legal 
opinions from legal experts. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A. The Considerations of Constitutional Court Judge in Issuing Constitutional Court Decision 
No. 36/PUU-XV/2017 against Judicial Review of Law No. 17 of 2014 concerning MD3 
Judge’s consideration is the judge’s opinion expressed after the trial is over. Constitutional 
Court Judge will hold a deliberation to take a stance whether to grant a petition or to reject/to declare 
                                                             
12May Lim Charity, “Implikasi Hak Angket Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia Terhadap Komisi 
Pemberantasan Korupsi”, Jurnal Legislasi Indonesia, Vol. 14, No. 3, September 2017, p. 253 
13Mei Susanto, “Hak Angket Sebagai Fungsi Pengawasan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat”, Jurnal Yudisial, Vol 11, 
No. 3 Desember 2018, p. 387. 
14Idul Rishan, “Relevansi Hak Angket Terhadap Komisi Negara Independen”, Jurnal Dialogia Iuridica, Vol. 
10, No.1, 
November 2018, p. 61 
15Dasep Muhammad Firdaus, “Hak Angket Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia (DPR RI) Terhadap 
Komisi  
Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK)”, Jurnal Asy Syariah, Vol.20, No.2, Desember 2018, p. 201 
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that a petition to test the constitutionality of a Law against the Basic Law cannot be accepted.
16
 In 
this regard, legal considerations can be interpreted as the essence of a decision. Judge’s legal 
considerations are the legal analysis, argumentation, opinion or conclusion of a judge examining a 
case. In giving considerations, a clear analysis based on the law is presented. Through the analysis, 
the judge can explain his opinion which was proven and was not formulated into a legal conclusion 
as the basis of a case to be set forth in the dictum of decision.
17
 Based on Constitutional Court 
Decision No. 36/PUU-XV/2017, the applicant does have a legal standing to submit a petition. 
However, after examining the petition and requesting information from relevant parties, such as 
statement of the President, statement of DPR, and expert statement, the Constitutional Court Judge 
rejected the petition for judicial review against Article 79 paragraph (3) of Law No. 17 of 2014 
concerning MD3 submitted by the applicant. The petition was submitted by Forum of Law and 
Constitutional Studies (FKHK) represented by Achmad Saifudin Firdaus S. H. (the Chair of FKHK) 
and Bayu Segara S. H. (the Secretary of FKHK) as Applicant I, Yudistira Rifky Darmawan as 
Applicant II, and Tri Susilo as Applicant III. The petition was submitted since the applicants who are 
active in studying Law and Constitution felt disadvantaged by the efforts to give a special inquiry 
right for DPR over KPK as stated in Article 79 paragraph (3) of Law No. 17 of 2014 concerning 
MD3. 
In the applicants’ point of view, the inquiry right applied to KPK will affect the investigation 
efforts as KPK can be forced to submit any data requested by DPR without any restrictions. Hence, 
the independence nature granted by the Law to KPK is disturbed so that this was considered as an 
intervention on the efforts to eradicate corruption that had been fought for. Broadly speaking, the 
consideration made by the Constitutional Court Judge in issuing Constitutional Court Decision No. 
36/PUU-XV/2017 is the inquiry right applied in Indonesia have been accepted as a term of 
constitutional practices since the enactment of the 1949 RIS Constitution and the 1950 UUDS which 
adheres to parliamentary system as a reference in implementing checks and balances. Then, in a 
semantic and historical perspective, the inquiry right is based on the British parliament in 1376 that 
became the main pioneer applying inquiry right. This inquiry right was originally intended to 
investigate and provide penalties for fraud in government administration called impeachment. To find 
out the purpose of inquiry right, the understanding of inquiry right cannot be separated from the 
supervisory function of DPR. In the State Constitutional Law, supervision means an activity aiming 
at ensuring the implementation of state administration in accordance with the applicable law. In 
Article 70 paragraph (3) of Law 17 of 2014, it is stated that the supervisory function owned by DPR 
involves how the law is implemented and how the state budget is used. 
In Constitutional Court Judge’s view, the result of DPR’s investigation through the use of 
inquiry right must not necessarily end in the use of the right to express opinions or even 
recommendations/proposals for the replacement of certain officials proven to violate the law. Thus, 
the results of inquiry right are interpreted as recommendations and references that are binding for 
future evaluation and improvement for ‘something’ that is the object of investigation. In terms of its 
functions, according to the 1945 Constitution, state institutions can be divided into two groups, 
namely 1) main state organs; and 2) auxiliary state organs. In fact, auxiliary state organs are not only 
at the level of constitutionally entrusted power as there are also auxiliary state organs whose 
authority is based on the Law or the lower regulations, such as Government Regulations, Presidential 
Regulations or Presidential Decrees.
18
 
                                                             
16
Maruarar Siahaan, 2012,Hukum Acara Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, Jakarta : Sinar Grafika, p. 
211. 
17
M. Yahya Harahap, 2015, Hukum Acara Perdata, Jakarta : Sinar Grafika, p. 809. 
18
Jimly Ashiddiqie, 2012,Perkembangan & Konsolidasi Lembaga Negara Pasca Reformasi,  Jakarta : Sinar 
Grafika, p. 216. 
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Therefore, in general, the Constitutional Court argues that auxiliary state organs are 
established due to the demand to achieve the increasingly complex state goals. The establishment of 
auxiliary state organs can be said to be a logical consequence of a modern state hoping to carry out 
the state functions more perfectly. Hence, the purpose of the establishment of auxiliary state organs is 
clear, namely to support the implementation of powers owned by the main state organs. In the view 
of Constitutional Court Judge, KPK is actually included to the realm of executives which carries out 
functions in the executive domain, namely investigation and prosecution. KPK is not included to the 
realm of judiciary as it is not a judicial body authorized to hear and decide cases. KPK is not also 
included to the realm of legislative as it is not a legislative organ. Its position in the realm of 
executives does not mean that KPK is independent and is free from the influence of any power. 
In terms of its duties, the Constitutional Court considers the Corruption Eradication 
Commission to have the following scope of duties; a) coordinating with agencies authorized to 
eradicate criminal acts of corruption; b) carrying out supervision against agencies authorized to 
eradicate criminal acts of corruption; (c) conducting investigations and prosecutions on criminal acts 
of corruption; (d) taking actions to prevent criminal acts of corruption; and e) monitoring the 
implementation of state administration. Thus, in the context of law enforcement, Police, Prosecutors’ 
Office and Corruption Eradication Commission are institutions that are given the duties and 
authorities to implement laws, one of which is the eradication of criminal acts of corruption. 
Although the Corruption Eradication Commission is an independent commission, as regulated in the 
Corruption Eradication Commission Law, but it is clear that these state institution is included to the 
realm of executives in carrying out its duties and authorities. With regard to the phrase “the 
implementation of a law and/or government policy” in the norms tested, the Constitutional Court 
argues that it cannot be used as a basis for stating that the inquiry right owned by DPR do not apply 
to KPK as an independent institution because, contextually, KPK is an organ or institution that is 
included to the realm of executives and implements the law in the field of law enforcement. 
Based on the considerations made by Constitutional Court to reject the petition and to limit 
the inquiry right owned by DPR over KPK, the author considers that there are several variables that 
make the case decision ambiguous and there are conclusions that appear to be forced to justify the 
efforts of a high institution to extend the power of supervision. The author argues that the position of 
the 1945 Constitution has a different orientation compared to the 1949 RIS Constitution and the 1950 
UUDS. This is due to the amendments to the 1945 Constitution which began in 1999 to 2001 in 
which it was agreed to maintain a presidential system by fully applying the existing values in a 
presidential system. This indicates that there are irregularities in legislative body in the current 
concept of democracy. Democracy has been considered as an important instrument in carrying out an 
ideal conception of the state to overcome the problem of upholding people’s power as its political 
concept is based on the mandate that power originates from the people, by the people, and for the 
people represented by the agreement reached by the legislative body as the main element of the three 
main branches in today’s democracy.19 
The agreement reached by the legislative body shall be based on the presidential concept as a 
whole, not be based on the mechanism carried out in the parliamentary concept adopted in the 
parliamentary system. Presidential system is interpreted as a concept that gives a great power to a 
President as the head of the state to run the state administration. Therefore, the supervisory function 
carried out by the legislative body by using inquiry righ is just a political game played by 
parliamentary body which contradicts with the programs run by the President and his staff. This is in 
                                                             
19Ellydar Chaidir & Suparto, “Implikasi Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Tentang Pemilu Serentak Terhadap 
Pencalonan Presiden dan Wakil Presiden Pada Pemilihan Umum Tahun 2019”, UIR Law Review, Volume 1, 
Nomor 1, 2017, p. 1. 
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line with the opinion of Mahfud MD who said that the determinant politics of law in terms of the 
character of each legal product will be highly determined or colored by the balance of power or 
political configuration that gave birth to it.
20
 
In general, concerning the interpretations used by the Panel of Judges, there are several 
interpretations used, namely: 
a. Grammatical interpretation, which emphasizes the importance of the position of language in 
order to give meaning to an object. 
b. Teleological or sociological interpretation, when the meaning of law is determined based on the 
social conditions and goals. With this interpretation, laws, that are still valid but are outdated or 
out of date, apply to current events, relationships, needs and interests. 
c. Systematic or logical interpretation, when a Law is always related to other legislations; it does 
not stand alone. 
d. Historical interpretation, which examines the history of the formation of the law. The historical 
interpretation of the law intends to find out the purpose of the provisions of the law at the time of 
its formation. 
e. Comparative interpretation, which is done by comparing several legal rules to seek clarity 
regarding the meaning of a provision. 
f. Futuristic interpretation, which explains the provisions of a law that does not yet have legal force. 
21
 
Looking at the various choices of interpretations that can be used by the panel of judges, it is 
unfortunate that the panel of judges places too much emphasis on the historical aspects of the use of 
inquiry right in the constitution. The judges’ assumptions are too rigid to consider the inquiry right as 
a natural thing to do by the House of Representatives. In fact, by looking at the current national 
condition, inquiry right is no longer needed as all supervisory mechanisms can be coordinated by 
other institutions, including the judiciary and the auditing institution that has clear legal 
consequences. The supervisory function carried out by other institutions has been widely applied in 
democratic government system, such as the Supreme Court by the Judicial Commission.
22
 
From the reasons stated by the applicant, the history of the use of inquiry right in the 
amendment to the 1945 Constitution is inappropriate to be applied in presidential government 
system. A presidential government system is a government system where the executive position is 
not accountable to the House of Representative. In other words, executive power is not under the 
parliamentary supervision. The presidential government system has several characteristics, namely: 
1. The President as the head of government leads the cabinets appointed by him and are accountable 
to him. At the same time, he is also the head of the state (state symbol) with a term of office 
determined by the Constitution; 
2. The President is not elected by the legislative body, but is elected by a number of voters. 
Therefore, he is not a part of the legislative body as in parliamentary government system; 
3. The President is not accountable to the legislative body and cannot be imposed by the legislative 
body; 
4. As a counterpart, the President cannot dissolve the legislative body.23 
                                                             
20
Moh Mahfud MD, 2010, Membangun Politik Hukum, Menegakkan Konstitusi,  Jakarta : Rajawali Pers, p. 37. 
21Suparto, “Perbedaan Tafsir Mahkamah Konstitusi Dalam Memutus Perkara Pemilihan Umum Serentak”, 
Jurnal Yudisial, Vol. 10, No.1, April 2017, p.. 6. 
22
 Suparto. (2019). The Comparsion Between the Judicial Commission of the Republik of Indonesia and the 
Netherlands Council for the Judiciary. UNIFIKASI : Jurnal Ilmu Hukum, 6(1), 40-52 
23
Titik Triwulan Tutik, 2010,Konstruksi Hukum Tata Negara Indonesia Pasca Amandemen UUD 1945, Jakarta 
: Kencana, p. 151. 
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In addition, there is another consideration of Constitutional Court Judge which is considered 
inappropriate related to the phrase “the implementation of a law and/or government policy” in the 
norm tested in which the Constitutional Court Judge argues that the principles of the constitution and 
the government system built on the basis of a check and balance paradigm must cover all powers. In 
author’s point of view, there is a mistake in interpreting the supervisory mechanism over each power 
holder. The political supervisory mechanism carried out by the legislative body has variables that are 
difficult to examine. It is different from technical supervisory mechanism. If we talk about who can 
feel constitutional loss due to the presence of KPK which is ineffective and tends to be detrimental, 
then the people is the party who has the right to judge and propose restrictions on the authority of 
KPK through judicial review. In other words, the law created by legislative body must not contradict 
with the Constitution or violate the constitutional rights.
24
 
KPK was established with the aim of carrying out duties that cannot be handled by law 
enforcement officials in eradicating criminal acts of corruption. Thus, KPK has the authority to carry 
out judicial acts, such as investigations and prosecutions. To ensure that the efforts made do not 
violate the applicable legislation, then supervision can be done to KPK in carrying out legal efforts 
for parties who feel disadvantaged due to case handling process. These efforts can be carried out 
through judicial process. Thus, in general, the supervision applied to KPK is complete, ranging from 
the use of the state budget during the service period to the errors and irregularities occurred during 
the case handling process. Besides, through the existing commission, DPR can also implement 
supervisory function through a Hearing Meeting (RDP) with KPK. Related to the inquiry right 
owned by DPR over KPK, expanding the explanation of the article potentially contradicts with the 
concept of a democratic state which basically contains the principle stated by J. B. J. M Ten Berg as 
the principle of legality, namely the limitation of freedom must be based on the principles regulated 
in the law.
25
 
Article 79 paragraph (3) of Law No. 17 of 2014 states: “inquiry right as referred to in 
paragraph (1) letter b is the right of DPR to conduct an investigation of the implementation of a law 
and/or government policy relating to important and strategic matters that have a broad impact on 
social, nation and state life and are considered to be in conflict with the legislation”.26 By looking at 
the provision of the Article, it is clear that the authority to conduct an inquiry is only aimed at the 
implementation of a law and/or government policy that contradicts with the law. Besides, by looking 
at the existing mechanism, it is clear that every policy carried out by state institutions has received 
adequate supervision both in terms of its administration and legal efforts that can be taken if KPK 
abuses its authority. The variable that becomes a question is the consideration of Constitutional Court 
Judge in classifying the inquiry to KPK as a mechanism for evaluation aimed at increasing the 
effectiveness of carrying out its power. In fact, as it can be seen that one of independent commissions 
in the field of justice, such as Judicial Commission, was established due to the weaknesses of the 
existing regulations so that they failed in creating an effective system to form an independent, 
impartial, clean, competent, and effective state institution.
27
 
Those goals shall be maintained in KPK which is expected to be able to continue carrying out 
its duties without supervision which tends to make KPK orbits directly against DPR as it will lead to 
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the assumption that the eradication of criminal acts of corruption is characterized by strong legal 
politics to protect the interests of lawmakers. This assumption will become a synthesis in the future 
when the desire to improve a more responsive law enforcement becomes a camouflage of lawmakers 
in diverting public distrust of parliamentary performance. Besides, it is inappropriate to say that a 
judge’s decision is unfair because the nature of Constitutional Court Decision is final and binding. 
Yet, it will be more appropriate to say that Constitutional Court Decision is in conflict with the value 
of justice. Now, the problem is the same application for the same norm cannot be submitted even 
though the applicant does not feel to get justice because the decision regarding the constitutionality 
of inquiry right against KPK has permanent legal force. 
In the context that KPK runs the executive domain, the nature of distribution of power needs 
to be re-examined. According to Soimin and Mashuriyanto, the distribution of power, as stated in the 
1945 Constitution, allows every high state institution to be able to interact and cooperate with each 
other with the authority granted by the 1945 Constitution without intervening with each other.
28
 The 
understanding of the nature of power distribution has provided a perspective on the subject of checks 
and balances. Supervision carried out by the legislative body, through the authority granted by the 
Constitution, is intended to supervise fellow high state institutions and is not an effort to make the 
supervision as an intervention. The inquiry right that has been conducted several times by DPR also 
tends to be only a formality as there is no clear result in realizing an effective supervisory 
mechanism. With regard to the Constitutional Court Decision, there are four Constitutional Court 
Judges, namely; Constitutional Court Judge, Maria Farida Indrati; Constitutional Court Judge I, 
Dewa Gede Palguna; Constitutional Court Judge, Suhartoyo; and Constitutional Court Judge, Saldi 
Isra. These four Constitutional Court Judges have different opinion, namely: The capacity to control 
potential abuses of executive power is a fundamental task that must be held by parliament. By 
considering the design of the Indonesian state regulated in the 1945 Constitution as well as the 
position and relation of the two branches of power based on article 20 A paragraph (2) of the 1945 
Constitution, in carrying out its constitutionality functions, DPR has the right of interpellation, the 
right of inquiry, and the right to express an opinion. As rights inherent in legislative body, each of 
these rights has different backgrounds. 
First, based on the historical interpretation, both in the parliamentary and presidential 
government system, inquiry right is a manifestation of the legislative supervisory authority over the 
executive as the holder of government power. Government can be interpreted as follows: 
1. Command is a statement aiming to ask someone to do something. 
2. Government is a power to govern a country or the highest body that governs a country (i.e. a 
cabinet is a government). 
3. Government is an act (way, thing, affairs, etc.) of governing.29  
The system used in Indonesia can be seen from the decisions made during the amendments to 
the 1945 Constitution; one of them by maintaining a presidential system. In Articles 4 and 17 of the 
1945 Constitution, it is stated that the President of the Republic of Indonesia holds governmental 
power, and in carrying out its governmental power, the President is assisted by the Vice President 
and the State Ministers. The State Ministers are appointed and dismissed by the President. It means 
that the position of the state ministers is highly dependent on the President.
30
 
Second, based on the systematic interpretation, by looking at the relationship between the 
overall norms contained in Article 79 of Law no. 17 of 2014, it cannot be interpreted other than it is 
aimed at the executive. It is because, when interpreting the state as a paradoxical instrument, on one 
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side, the state becomes a tool for the welfare of the people, but, on the other hand, the state becomes 
a tool of legitimacy for the elite class to deviate and escape its interests. Hence, the state becomes the 
scope of corrupt behavior, especially if the state is led by an authoritarian regime and the institutional 
control is not functioning.
31
 
Third, based on the authentic interpretation, Article 79 paragraph (3) of Law no. 17 of 2014 is 
also not possible to be interpreted to include things outside the scope of government power 
(executive). In the explanation of Article 79 paragraph (3) of Law No. 17 of 2014, it is stated “the 
implementation of a law and/or government policy can be in the form of policy implemented by the 
President, the Vice President, the State Minister, the National Police, the Attorney General, or the 
Head of non-ministerial government agencies”. Thus, there have been restrictions imposed by 
lawmakers on the scope of the object of inquiry right so that it only covers executive power. Of the 
three interpretations, both historically, systematically and authentically, there is a conclusion which is 
in accordance with the aspect of unity of the constitution, the aspect of practical coherence, and the 
aspect of apropriate working of the constitution. The concept can be elaborated with an explanation 
that as a state, the principle of the rule of law is strongly embedded in the government system in 
Indonesia. It implies that in carrying out any action, the state, including the government and other 
state institutions, must be based on law or must be responsible.
32
 
Law shall not be separated from the idea of justice. According to Hans Kelsen, separating the 
concept of law from the idea of justice is quite difficult because they are constantly mixed politically 
with regard to the ideological tendency to make law appear as justice. Thus, it can be concluded that 
the rules governing human behavior shall apply to everyone and everyone finds joy in it.
33
 Further, 
practically, Indonesia adopted a presidential government system. Hence, the President is the main 
responsible person of the government (executive). If we look for references to describe the 
development of modern law, then we must refer to the development of community and its laws that 
occur in western world, not from our own community.
34
 
Concerning the legislative supervisory system over the government, the constitution has set 
the supervisory concept to supervise the executive power. The Constitution has regulated the main 
state organs in which the President holds the mandate of the 1945 Constitution and the Law in 
running the government. Along with the strong position of the President, the House of 
Representatives is present to provide pressure so that the concept of checks and balances can be 
applied by using the inquiry right owned by the executive. Constitutional Court Judge, Maria Farida, 
believes the establishment of KPK is a continuation of MPR Decree No. VIII/MPR/2001 concerning 
Recommendation of the Direction of Policy on Eradication and Prevention of Corruption, Collusion 
and Nepotism. In the consideration of letter b, it is stated “that government agencies handling 
criminal acts of corruption have not functioned effectively and efficiently in eradicating corruption.” 
From the description, it is clear that KPK is an institution that has different orientation from 
the Police and the Prosecutors’ Office. Yet, according to Satjipto Rahardjo, the law has its own 
dynamism which is not always imagined and anticipated by the lawmaker itself; the law has become 
like that since it was “released” to the community so that the lawmaker is no longer the one playing 
the role, but the interaction between the law and the real conditions plays the role.
35
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The establishment of KPK, whose authority derives from the law, does not necessarily make 
it a mandate for the House of Representatives which is given strict supervision like the President and 
the State Ministries who are the main executors of the formation of the law. If we analogize every 
institution established by the law as part of the scope of inquiry right, then it will become a time 
bomb that will worsen the balance of the axis of power. The nature of Constitutional Court Decision 
which is binding on all parties, as the regulation being tested is the Law, makes the Constitutional 
Court unconsciously gives an additional constitutional basis to DPR to summon any institution that is 
in conflict with the political orientation desired by DPR. This act is a denial of the concept designed 
by Parliament during the amendments to the 1945 Constitution in which it was agreed to implement a 
full presidential system and avoid mechanisms deemed to be failed in the new order. 
Eventually, the core of checks and balances supervisory mechanism will emerge, namely 
what kind of supervision is appropriate for supervising auxiliary state organs whose main nature is 
not directly carrying out the main functions of the axis of power, such as legislative, executive, and 
judiciary. The main reason of using inquiry right is basically the efforts made to revise government 
policies in the politics of state administration. The use of inquiry right to institutions engaged in law 
enforcement is not an urgent matter considering that law enforcement that is intervened by political 
interests often causes the degradation of the spirit of corruption eradication. If we relate the 
supervision conducted by DPR through the inquiry right to the concrete cases stated in the petition, 
then KPK is included in the realm of executives which stands independently in carrying out its duties 
and authorities. Although KPK is not responsible to the public and reports openly and periodically to 
the President of the Republic of Indonesia, the House of Representatives, and the Audit Board, KPK 
should not be the object of DPR’s inquiry right. Besides, if we look at the previous Constitutional 
Court Decision, then Constitutional Court Decision No. 36/PUU-XV/2017 has the potential to 
conflict with the Constitutional Court Decision No. 012-016-019/PUU-IV/2006 concerning Judicial 
Review of Law No. 30 of 2002 concerning Commission for the Eradication of Criminal Acts of 
Corruption.
36
 
 
B.  The implications of the Constitutional Court Decision No. 36/PUU-XV/2017 against Judicial 
Review of Law No. 17 of 2017 concerning MPR, DPR, DPD and DPRD in Relation to the 
Position of KPK 
1.  The Position of Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) 
Various views have emerged after the Constitutional Court rejected the petition and decided 
that the inquiry right owned by DPR over KPK is constitutional as long as it does not concern 
investigations and prosecutions which were the main duties of KPK as the state commission of the 
Republic of Indonesia in realizing the state’s goal to eradicate corruption. In author’s opinion, with 
the issuance of Constitutional Court Decision No.36/PUU-XV/2017, the constitutionality of inquiry 
right as the right to investigate the implementation of the law and/or government policy is not in 
doubt because the Constitutional Court declares the inquiry right is constitutional as long as it does 
not concern judicial duties (investigations and prosecutions) of Corruption Eradication Commission. 
However, Corruption Eradication Commission which is an ad hoc institution should 
maximize the coordination and supervision functions of the Police and the Prosecutors. This is in 
accordance with the function of trigger mechanism as mandated by the law. KPK will not 
monopolize the handling of corruption cases. The presence of KPK is expected to stimulate and 
increase the capacity of other law enforcement officials to jointly prevent and eradicate corruption. 
The success of KPK is also measured by its success as an institution that has a trigger mechanism 
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function, not only from the number of cases handled each year.
37
 Based on Law No. 30 of 2002 and 
Law No. 28 of 1999 concerning Good State Governance that is Free of Corruption, Collusion and 
Nepotism, KPK has the duties to: 
a. Coordinate with agencies authorized to eradicate criminal acts of corruption; 
b. Carry out supervision against agencies authorized to eradicate criminal acts of corruption; 
c. Conduct investigations and prosecutions on criminal acts of corruption; 
d. Take actions to prevent criminal acts of corruption and monitor the implementation of state 
administration.
38
 
As the Constitutional Court has included KPK to the realm of executives, then DPR has the 
right to ask for the accountability of KPK in carrying out its duties and authorities, even though KPK 
is an independent state institution. In its consideration, the Constitutional Court Judge states that 
KPK is independent in the sense of being free from other powers; DPR as the people’s representative 
has the right to ask for the accountability of KPK in carrying out its duties and authorities.
39
 
The nature of Constitutional Court Decision which is declatoir constitutief towards the testing 
of the law shows that the Constitutional Court Decision creates or negates a new legal condition or 
establishes law as a negative legislator so that it does not require an officer carrying out the 
Constitutional Court Decision.
40
 Thus, if the government or other state institutions do not comply 
with the decision and apply the law that has been declared not to have binding legal force, then there 
will be a personal loss to compensate for losses through the political process in DPR which has been 
become a very important part in upholding justice mechanism in this country. 
If this condition happens, it would not be in accordance with the independent meaning as an 
authentic characteristic contained in the law governing the establishment of Corruption Eradication 
Commission. Yet, theoretically, KPK still remains an independent institution that can be seen from 
its coordination and supervision functions as a logical consequence of the role of KPK as an 
independent and superbody institution and as a result of ineffective works done by the police and 
prosecutors in eradicating corruption in the early era of reform. In legal political manner, an inquiry 
right is basically driven by political interests to limit the power of the head of government who has 
the possibility of interpreting state agency policies differently. Thus, Corruption Eradication 
Commission becomes the subject of state institutions in the Constitution which can be disputed at 
any time through inquiry right owned by DPR. 
2.     Constitutional Court Decision Gives Limitation on the Objects of Inquiry Right 
            Inquiry right is a part of supervisory mechanism carried out by DPR. To discuss the 
supervisory role of DPR, the first thing to consider is the provisions contained in the explanation of 
the 1945 Constitution. In the explanation of the 1945 Constitution, it is stated that “DPR can always 
supervise the actions of the President, if the Council considers that the President has violated the state 
guidelines set by the 1945 Constitution.”41 The phrase “can always supervise the actions of the 
President” indicates the supervisory function of DPR over the President as the organizer of 
government power, namely whether the state administration runs in accordance with the guideline set 
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by the 1945 Constitution or by the MPR. Thus, in terms of supervisory function, the relationship 
between DPR and the President is unilateral because only DPR that has the right to supervise the 
President.
42
 However, in its decision, the Constitutional Court states that KPK was included into the 
realm of executive power even though KPK is not directly responsible to the President. The decision 
was taken by the Constitutional Court based on three basic aspects; one of which is because KPK 
conducts investigations and prosecutions in corruption, but its nature remains independent.
43
 
Article 24 paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia states: 
“Other institutions whose functions are related to judicial powers shall be regulated by law”.  
The phrase “shall be regulated by law” indicates that the law does not need to be specific, 
such as the law on the Prosecutors’ Office, the Police, etc. It means that the provisions regarding 
other institutions are sufficiently regulated by law. Thus, Corruption Eradication Commission 
established through law will certainly have a constitutional importance as an institution which was 
decided by Constitutional Court Decision to include to the scope of institutions that can be 
supervised by DPR.
44
 
If the reason of using DPR’s inquiry right over KPK is in the context of carrying out the 
principle of checks and balances, it is not appropriate to use inquiry right as the only form of 
supervision over KPK considering that DPR, in the framework of supervisory function, can hold a 
meeting with KPK at any time, especially in a Meeting Commissions in the form of hearings or 
when KPK submits an annual report to the DPR, the President and the Audit Board. With this form 
of supervision, KPK will be far from the impression of intervention or interference from DPR and 
does not harm the principle of check and balance considering that supervision is carried out by the 
legislative body to the executive. If supervision is carried out by using inquiry right, then there is a 
potential for intervention from DPR. Considering that the Inquiry Right has investigation aspect, 
DPR can summon various parties related to the case or issue to obtain complete information from 
various aspects and reviews. Besides, DPR can use subpoena right, namely the right to forcefully 
summon a party by asking the police to bring the party by force. The party then gives information in 
a public hearing so that the public can follow directly or get information from the news in the 
media.
45
 It is difficult to imagine if the person who will be questioned is a person who is undergoing 
legal proceedings in KPK, whether as a witness or suspect/defendant, because it will then greatly 
interfere with the legal process, especially if there is no guarantee that the use of inquiry right will 
not be in contact with judicial domain. If it happens, the confidential information in law enforcement 
can be leaked to certain parties. This condition will endanger law enforcement and disrupt the 
performance of KPK as the front guard in eradicating corruption. The position of KPK as an 
independent state institution, as stated in Article 3 of Law No. 30 of 2002, is feared to loss its 
independent nature due to the power that can affect its duties and authorities. This condition will 
certainly tarnish the spirit of the establishment of this anti-racial institution as an institution 
responsible for eradicating corruption that cannot be intervened by any power.
46
 
Even though the Constitutional Court has issued Constitutional Court Decision No. 36/PUU-
XV/2017 which limits the inquiry right to not enter the realm of judiciary, but no one can guarantee 
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if the use of inquiry right will not enter the realm of judiciary considering that DPR is a political 
institution. Hence, all political interests are very likely to be inserted in the use of inquiry right 
against KPK, especially if someone being processed (investigated or prosecuted) by KPK is a 
member of DPR who has a strategic position in parliament. This condition will certainly become a 
threat for KPK as an independent law enforcement institution. Besides, this condition is also feared 
to disrupt the performance of KPK when KPK will investigate the involvement of DPR members in 
a corruption case. The disruption of the performance of KPK is reasonable because DPR can use its 
inquiry right. If there is a massive number of corruption cases involving DPR members, even though 
with an excuse that the inquiry right is only used to investigate the implementation of the law and/or 
policies outside the context of judicial duties (investigation and prosecution), but, psychologically, it 
will burden KPK and will lead to ineffective performance of KPK in eradicating corruption cases 
involving DPR members. Normatively, the inquiry right of DPR to KPK is in conflict with KPK 
Law which is lex specialis in nature and KIP Law.47 Although there are still pros and cons, the 
Constitutional Court as a state institution given the authority by the constitution to examine the Law 
has made its decision which is final and binding. Therefore, as the state based on the rule of law, all 
parties must obey to the decision. Yet, to clarify the regulation of inquiry right, it is necessary to 
make a law on DPR’s inquiry right which is separated from MD3 Law.48 
 
CONCLUSION 
            The consideration of the Constitutional Court in issuing Constitutional Court Decision No. 
36/PUU-XV/2017 is based on the fact that the inquiry right held by DPR is constitutional as long as 
it does not relate to the authority of investigation and prosecution owned by KPK because KPK is a 
state institution that is included to the realm of executives. This issue has become something new in 
the Indonesian state administration because, since the reform era, the inquiry right only applied to the 
President as the head of government as well as the departmental or ministerial institutions that are 
directly responsible to the President. Ideally, state institutions that are not directly responsible to the 
President have a special supervisory mechanism. It is different from the state ministers who are 
directly responsible to the President so that they are included in the object of DPR’s inquiry right. 
The Constitutional Court Decision is ambiguous and has the potential to conflict with the previous 
decision, namely Constitutional Court Decision No. 012-016-019/PUU-IV/2006. 
              Rejecting the petition for constitutionality test of inquiry right will give rise to a new 
oligarchy in this Republic. The issuance of the Constitutional Court Decision has shifted the position 
of KPK due to: 1) the influence of the strong pressure given by DPR to KPK even though the inquiry 
right cannot touch the authority of KPK in conducting Investigations and Prosecutions. However, 
there is an indication that the inquiry effort is basically not a legal effort, but rather a political effort 
which is widely practiced in countries adhering to a parliamentary system where the parliament tends 
to be more dominant than the executive; and 2) KPK is currently not a fully independent state 
institution because, constitutionally, it is the object of inquiry right, even though KPK has actually 
accounted its performance to the state through an audit conducted by BPK. 
 
SUGGESTION 
The suggestions proposed in this study are; 1) in deciding on a case, Constitutional Court 
Judges should use a stronger grammatical and systematic interpretation based on original intense; 
and 2) there needs to be a more thorough and complete evaluation of the scope of the inquiry object 
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that can be used by DPR against state institutions that are not directly responsible to the President as 
the head of government and is stated in the revision of MD3 Law. 
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